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Abstract. In the early termination of public-private partnership (PPP) projects, compensation is considered a core issue 
that greatly affects the interests of the government and the private sector. To address the early termination that is frequently 
caused by government default or voluntary buyback, this paper proposes an ex-ante compensation mechanism using the 
cumulative probability that a given demand could be realized to determine early termination compensation under demand 
uncertainty. By splitting the compensation into two parts, the base compensation could be the minimum compensation for 
the private sector, while the additional compensation is considered a reasonable allocation of future booming demand. The 
predetermined compensation criterion ensures a smooth transfer of the early terminated project, which not only benefits 
the government from being overcharged, but also enables the private sector to gain a reasonable compensation for the re-
maining concession period.
Keywords: public-private partnership, early termination, compensation, risk management, Monte Carlo simulation, 
demand uncertainty.
Introduction
Public-private partnership (PPP), which is recognized as 
a mutual commitment between the government and the 
private sector, has been globally applied with increased 
value for money to provide public services and infrastruc-
ture projects. As an important financing approach for the 
government to attract private investment, the PPP scheme 
works effectively to achieve social efficiency, improve ser-
vice quality and relieve financial pressure from the gov-
ernment (HM Treasury, 2012).
Thus far, a large number of PPP projects have been 
successfully developed in the field of transportation, in-
frastructure and social services. However, the experiences 
of many other projects have not always been positive, an 
important issue of which is early termination (Valipour 
et al., 2015). According to the data that are provided by 
the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database 
of World Bank (2017), 662 out of 16,085 PPP projects 
were cancelled across the world between 1980 and 2017. 
Generally, the early termination of PPP projects refers to 
the ending of an agreement ahead of its scheduled expiry 
by either party that is involved in the PPP agreement. 
In practice, most of the projects, for instance the Cali-
fornia Route 91 Express Lanes in the US (Iseki & Hout-
man, 2012) and Skye Bridge in the UK (Soomro & Zhang, 
2013), were terminated in the operation period, while a 
few projects, including the National Physical Laboratory 
in the UK (National Audit Office, 2006), were terminated 
in the construction period.
Two representative real-world projects and their out-
comes are briefly presented to illustrate the complexity in 
early-terminated cases. The 91 Express Lanes in California, 
completed in 1995 with total investment of 134 million US$ 
and concession period of 35 years, was delivered as a DB-
FO-style project. However, the increased congestion on the 
lanes, growing safety concerns and demands for a new road 
from the public compelled the government to consider the 
option of road expansion to add capacity, which violated 
the “exclusive clause” signed in the contract. As a result, the 
project was terminated 12 years later with a compensation 
of 207.5 million US$ to the concessionaire, much higher 
than its capital investment of 134 million US$.
Another failure case is Wutong Mountain Tunnel in 
China. The BOT contract came into effect in 1997 with 
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a 30 years concession period. The project, however, con-
stantly suffered from public appeals of cancelling the toll 
due to frequent congestions and increasing toll level. 
Failed to reach an agreement on the presented solutions, 
the government invested a competitive free channel along-
side the tunnel, which brought heavy losses to the private 
sector. The government eventually bought back the project 
at a fairly low price, while both parties suffered huge losses 
during the interminable negotiation period.
In the above cases, the private sector relied on the fact 
that the increasing traffic volume guarantees considerable 
profit in the remaining concession period, making further 
attempts from the public sector difficult during the ne-
gotiation process. It shows that without ex-ante compen-
sation mechanisms, a lose-lose situation may turn out to 
be inescapable since neither party would compromise on 
their interests.
The critical influencing factors for early termination 
can be summarized as government default factors, pri-
vate sector default factors and non-default factors (Lee 
& Choi, 2015; Martins, Rui, & Cruz, 2011; Song, Hu, & 
Feng, 2017a). Government default mainly refers to the 
violation of the government’s contractual obligations that 
frustrates the private sector’s ability to operate the pro-
ject or deliver the service (EPEC, 2012). Private sector 
default mainly refers to the breaches of any of its obliga-
tions that affect service performance (Iossa, Spagnolo, & 
Vellez, 2007; Zhang & Xiong, 2015). Non-default factors 
include force majeure, voluntary buyback by the gov-
ernment, modifications of related laws, changes in the 
market interest rate and so on (Iossa et al., 2007; Iseki & 
Houtman, 2010).
In the event of early termination, valid project assets 
are generally either transferred to another private sector 
or to the government to continuously provide services. 
Therefore, the private sector is entitled to claim compen-
sation from the government in accordance with the fol-
lowing principles (Iossa et  al., 2007; Iseki & Houtman, 
2010; U.S. Treasury, 2017): if the early termination is 
caused by government default or voluntary buyback, the 
private sector should be compensated for lost profit in 
the remaining concession period, outstanding debts and 
additional costs due to the termination (e.g., redundancy 
payment for employees, sub-contractor breakage cost); if 
caused by private sector default, part of the initial invest-
ment should be compensated, and the government has 
no obligation to reimburse the equity that was invested 
for the reason that the senior lenders are insured; if the 
early termination is caused by reasons of non-default, 
financial damages should be undertaken by both the gov-
ernment and the private sector, and the latter should be 
partially compensated for lost profit, outstanding debts 
and additional costs.
With regard to the risk allocation in PPP projects, a 
general principle is that the risk should be allocated to 
the party who can assess and manage it best (Irwin, 2007), 
based on which a number of risk allocation schemes 
(Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005; Hwang, 
Zhao, & Gay, 2013; Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010; Ng 
& Loosemore, 2007; Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 
2008) have been developed through questionnaire survey 
and case studies. Besides, quantitative methods, such as 
real options (Buyukyoran & Gundes, 2018; Liu & Cheah, 
2009; Shan, Garvin, & Kumar, 2010), fuzzy synthetic eval-
uation model (Xu, Yeung, J. F. Chan, A. P. Chan, Wang, & 
Ke, 2010), artificial neural networks model (Jin & Zhang, 
2011), fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model (Khazaeni, 
Khanzadi, & Afshar, 2012), principal-agent model (Moore, 
Boardman, & Vining, 2017) and bargaining model (Li, X. 
Wang, & Y. Wang, 2016; Medda, 2007) were adopted to 
investigate risk allocation tools for PPP projects.
For the early termination of PPP projects, the deter-
mination of appropriate compensation is considered to be 
a core issue for both the government and the private sec-
tor. Practically, a large number of early termination events 
contribute to the default or initiative buyback by the gov-
ernment. In fact, government decision error and govern-
ment payment default are considered as the most common 
reasons for early terminated projects in China (Song, Hu, 
& Feng, 2017a). In this situation, the lost profit is recog-
nized as an important compensation claim, the determi-
nation of which, however, remains controversial to both 
parties due to a lack of effective compensation mechanism 
and inaccurate estimation of demand.
The existing literatures suggest that real-option and 
NPV method are two most commonly adopted methods 
in the quantitative analysis of early termination compen-
sation. The real option can capture the valuable sources of 
flexibility that are either inherent in, or can be built into, 
corporate assets (Schwartz & Trigeorgis, 2004; Trigeorgis, 
1996). Alonso-Conde, Brown, and Rojo-Suarez (2007) 
proposed a valuation model to distinguish early termina-
tion option from delay payment option and illustrated it 
by using the Melbourne CityLink project. Huang and Pi 
(2013) established a real-option valuation model with an 
extension of the classical Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) 
model and discussed the reconciliation between perfor-
mance bonds and termination rights. Liu, Gao, and Cheah 
(2017) examined pricing mechanisms for early termina-
tion of PPP projects under the scenario of excessively high 
or excessively low cash flows using real option theory.
While the NPV method is best suited to relatively safe 
investments and cash cow assets whose value depends 
primarily on forecasted cash flows (Ng, Xie, Cheung, & 
Jefferies, 2007; Xiong, Zhang, & Chen, 2015; Zhang & 
AbouRizk, 2006). Xiong and Zhang (2014) introduced 
two compensation approaches, specifically compensation 
based on financial statement and compensation based on 
discounted value of the future cash flow to address long-
term project risks and demand uncertainty. Based on a 
market value approach, Xiong et  al. (2015) developed 
an early termination compensation model using the dis-
counted cash flow technique with the consideration of the 
uncertainties of stochastic variables. Song, Fu, and Bagaya 
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(2016) proposed an ARIMA model to forecast key influ-
encing factors as dynamic time series data for early ter-
mination of highway BOT projects. Besides, game theory 
was also applied to estimate the compensation for BOT 
highway projects with incomplete contracts (Song, Jin, 
Zhao, & Hu, 2017b).
The current NPV-based compensation approaches 
are mostly proposed to estimate discounted cash flows in 
the remaining concession period by developing forecast-
ing techniques such as regression analysis and time series 
analysis, and determine the compensation only based on 
the future cash flows before the termination date. Differ-
ent from these studies, this paper aims at proposing an 
ex-ante compensation mechanism at the initial stage of 
a project and facilitating the compensation criterion de-
signs before the early termination occurs. Focusing on the 
frequent scenario where termination occurs as a result of 
default or voluntary buyback by the government, a math-
ematical model is constructed to tackle with the demand 
uncertainty based on probabilistic analysis, through which 
the demand risk is fairly allocated between the govern-
ment and the private sector as they jointly confirmed the 
demand forecast result and compensation criterion ac-
cording to the initial demand forecast. Then annual com-
pensation is calculated by adopting NPV method with 
an overriding principle that the compensation should be 
neither overcharged for the government nor too meagre 
for the private sector to cover losses. Meanwhile, detailed 
provision and specific guidance are designed to deliver eq-
uitable result regarding to early termination events.
1. Research design
1.1. Compensation mechanism
Generally, the demand quantity faces great uncertainty 
due to the long life cycle of the PPP projects, posing signif-
icantly influences on their ultimate profitability (Kokkaew 
& Wipulanusat, 2014; Vassallo, Ortega, & Baeza, 2011). 
Given that the compensation mechanism is established 
before a project actually comes into service, demand fore-
casting for the whole concession period is necessary dur-
ing the bidding period based on offerings by bidders in 
their proposals, and it should be evaluated by a govern-
ment assessment panel (Zhang & Kumaraswamy, 2001). 
In practice, the Monte Carlo simulation is recognized as 
a feasible method to measure uncertainties and forecast 
critical variables in the project evaluation process (Kwak 
& Ingall, 2007). By running the simulation with a large 
number of iterates, the values of randomly generated tar-
get variables will follow a typical statistical distribution, 
where the statistical description of the parameters, such 
as the mean value, maximum value and standard devia-
tion, can be obtained as outputs of the simulation (Rezaie, 
Amalnik, Gereie, Ostadi, & Shakhseniaee, 2007).
Given the high uncertainty of the actual demand in 
the remaining concession period, a flexible compensation 
mechanism is developed by splitting the annual compen-
sation into two parts: the base compensation and the ad-
ditional compensation. The base compensation is deter-
mined according to the minimum demand guarantee that 
could be obtained by the private sector regardless of how 
the actual demand changes. The additional compensation 
is recognized as a bonus amount in cases of booming de-
mand in the future.
To demonstrate the compensation mechanism under 
different annual demands, an analyzing schematics is 
constructed. As is shown in Figure 1(a), without loss of 
generality, the probability distribution of the annual de-
mand is assumed to be bell-shaped (Ye & Tiong, 2003; 
Zhang & AbouRizk, 2006), which indicates that the val-
ues with a high probability are located in the middle area, 
and the values with a low probability are located on two 
sides. The “most-likely” value, which is also recognized as 
the mean value of the simulation outputs, is determined 
to be the referential demand. If the actual demand is less 
than or equal to the referential demand, it is marked as 
a “pessimistic case” or a “moderate case”, respectively; if 
the actual demand is more than the referential demand, 
it is then marked as an “optimistic case” to indicate the 
booming demand.
Figure 1. Compensation analysis under different annual 
demands
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well as the additional compensation; otherwise, only the 
base compensation is counted. As the annual compensa-
tion is determined, the total compensation is obtained by 
accumulating each of the discounted annual compensa-
tion to the termination year.
2. Compensation model
2.1. Assumptions
Consider a PPP project that is bought back in advance 
by the government. The planned operation period is T0 
years, while the government voluntarily terminates the 
concession agreement at year T. The initial construction 
cost I0, which was paid before the operation period be-
gan, has been recovered in the operation period. As the 
compensation model mainly deals with lost profit for the 
remaining concession period, outstanding debts and other 
cost items are not discussed. Additionally, the early termi-
nation compensation, which is determined on the basis of 
the above-described compensation mechanism, should be 




In the bidding period, a series of annual demands within 
T0 years are forecasted as the basis to determine the com-
pensation. Assume that the annual demand increases from 
an initial value with a specific annual growth rate (Pante-
lias & Zhang, 2010):
Accordingly, the cumulative probability curve is il-
lustrated in Figure 1(b), which indicates the probability 
that a given demand could be practically realized. As 
the annual demand increases from the minimum to the 
maximum, the cumulative probability that the annual 
demand could actually achieve will decline from 100% 
to 0%, which means that a low demand level is practi-
cally easier to realize then a high demand level. In an 
optimistic case, the booming demand is realized with a 
relatively low probability, and the demand above the ref-
erential level leads to excessive revenue. In this case, the 
excessive demand should be allocated fairly due to the 
private sector’s declaration and acknowledgement that 
the project has a low probability of achieving an exces-
sive demand in the bidding period. Therefore, an alloca-
tion proportion for excessive demand is developed based 
on probabilistic analysis, which indicates the percentage 
that is accounted for by the additional compensation in 
the excessive revenue.
As indicated in Figure 1(c), with an initial value of 
100%, which denotes that the excessive demand is fully 
compensated, the allocation proportion sequentially de-
clines to 0% until the annual demand increases to the 
maximum value. The additional compensation for the 
private sector can be expressed as the shaded area, which 
is enclosed by the curve and horizontal axis with an in-
terval from the referential demand to the actual demand. 
The allocation of the excessive demand ensures that the 
additional compensation goes up when the actual demand 
increases but with a lower growth rate, thus it retains the 
additional compensation in the private sector at a reason-
able level.
The annual compensation, as is illustrated in Figure 
1(d), is determined as the sum of the base compensation 
and the additional compensation. For pessimistic or mod-
erate cases, only the base compensation is counted by the 
government; for optimistic cases, the base compensation 
and the additional compensation are both counted. Based 
on the annual compensation, the total compensation for 
the remaining concession period is then accumulated as 
a one-time payment by each of the annual compensation 
discounting to the termination year.
1.2. Overall framework
The overall framework of the compensation mechanism 
is shown in Figure 2. In the bidding period, an ex-ante 
compensation mechanism is established by determining a 
series of annual referential demands based on the Monte 
Carlo simulation and negotiating the compensation cri-
terion in advance. In the operation period, the actual de-
mand data are acquired, upon which the prediction of the 
future demand is based. The base compensation and the 
additional compensation can be calculated by comparing 
the future demand and the referential demand. If the fu-
ture demand is more than the referential demand, the pri-
vate sector is compensated with the base compensation as 
 
Future demand >  
referential demand? 
Bidding period 
• Determine annual referential demand 
• Negotiate the compensation criterion in advance 
Operation period 
• Acquire actual demand data 
• Predict future demand 
Calculate base 
compensation 
Achieve total compensation by accumulating each discounted 
annual compensation to the termination year 




Figure 2. Framework of compensation mechanism
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where: Qt = annual demand in year t, t∈[1,T0]; Q0 = ini-
tially determined demand in the first year; πj  = annual 
growth rate for year j + 1, j ∈[1,T0 – 1].
A Monte Carlo simulation is performed to forecast 
Qt, where the normal distribution N(µQ, 
2
Qσ ) and N(µπ, 
2
πσ ) are separately assigned to Q0 and πj to reduce the 
estimation error (Ye & Tiong, 2003; Zhang & AbouRizk, 
2006); thus, Qt becomes a stochastic output variable. After 
running the simulation with a large number of iterates, 
the probability distribution of Qt forms a bell shape with 
the highest probability value (most-likely value) occurs at 
the peak point. The most-likely value, which is denoted 
as rtQ , is recognized as the referential demand in year t.
Actual demand
The annual actual demand in year t, which is denoted as 
a
tQ , is acquired from the actual operation data within T 
years. Once atQ  is determined, an offset coefficient that 
a













Through the collection of atQ , a series of ati  can be 
obtained, upon which the prediction of the future demand 
is based.
Predicted demand
When early termination occurs, the annual predicted de-
mand from T + 1 to T0, which is denoted as 
p






tQ iQ= + , (3)
where: pti  = predicted offset coefficient that 
p
tQ deviates 
from rtQ . By adopting time series analysis, such as moving 
averages and regression methods (Adamowski, Fung Chan, 
Prasher, Ozga-Zielinski, & Sliusarieva, 2012), the predicted 
future values are extracted from the previously observed 
values; therefore, pti  can be predicted based on ati .
2.3. Estimation of Net Present Value
The net cash flow (NCF) of a project comes from the dif-
ference between cash inflow (CI) and cash outflow (CO):
t t tNCF CI CO−= , (4)
where: NCFt = annual net cash flow in year t; CIt = annual 
cash inflow in year t; COt = annual cash outflow in year 
t, which refers to I0 in the construction period and the 
O&M cost during the operation period.
For the simplicity, it is assumed that annual cash in-
flow is calculated as the product of unit price and annual 
demand (Ng, Xie, Cheung, & Jefferies, 2007):
t t t
rCI P Q= , (5)
where: Pt = unit price in year t.
Prediction of Pt can be achieved based on historical 
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where: P0 and Pt–1 are unit price for the first year and year 
t – 1, respectively; It = inflation rate in year t; Xt and Zt 
represent the X-factor (productivity offset) and Z-factor 
(capital recovery factor) in year t, respectively.
The O&M cost, which is directly linked to the scale of 
initial construction cost and project service time, covers 
the operation cost, maintenance cost and overhaul cost 
that comes in subsequent operation years over the pro-
ject’s life cycle. In this study, the O&M cost is standardized 
in relation to the initial construction cost and cost escala-
tion rate (Pantelias & Zhang, 2010), and it is expressed as:
1
0(1 )ttCO I f −= ε + , (7)
where: ε = cost coefficient, which indicates the percentage 
of the first year’s O&M cost counts in I0; f = cost escala-
tion rate.
During the bidding period, the discounted cash flow 
(DCF) analysis is commonly adopted by bidders to evalu-
ate the feasibility of the investment opportunity (Luehr-
man, 1997). With the aim of measuring the profitability 
of a long-term project using the time value of money, the 
accumulated net present value (Shen, H. Li, & Q. M. Li, 












= ∑ , (8)
where: NPVt = accumulated net present value generated 
within t years; r  = annual discount rate. The discount 
rate refers to the interest rate assessed on loans offered to 
eligible depository institutions such as commercial banks 
(Zhang & AbouRizk, 2006). It is also used in DCF analysis 
to determine the present value of future cash flows.
Within the whole concession period, a positive NPV 
means that the project is profitable and feasible; otherwise 
it should be rejected by the bidders. In a least-present-
value-of-net-revenue (LPVNR) bidding mechanism, the 
bids are evaluated on the basis of the technical and price 
proposals, and the winning bid is chosen according to the 
lowest 
0
TNPV  (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2001; Nomb-
ela & De Rus, 2004). Therefore the private sector is com-
pelled to conduct the demand forecast cautiously to give 
a more accurate estimation result.
2.4. Compensation determination
Base compensation
For early terminations that are caused by government de-
fault or voluntary buyback, the minimum demand guar-
antee should be provided in the concession agreement, 
by which the government guarantees a minimum com-
pensation if the future demand falls below the referential 
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demand. The base annul compensation in the remaining 
concession period, which is determined as the minimum 
compensation for any of the pessimistic, moderate or op-
timistic cases, is equal to the profit that could be obtained 
by the private sector under the referential demand:
1
0(1 )rt t tt IB P Q fC −= − ε + , (9)
where: BCt = annual base compensation for year t,  
t ∈[T + 1,T0].
For a moderate or pessimistic year in which p rt tQ Q≤ , 
the annual compensation equals to the annual base com-
pensation.
Additional compensation
For an optimistic case in which p rt tQ Q> , the annual 
compensation should be the annual base compensation 
plus the annual additional compensation. Inspired by the 
excess revenue sharing mechanism, the excessive demand 
should be reasonably allocated between the government 
and the private sector. According to the calculation meth-
od of progressive taxation (Bankman & Griffith, 1987), 
instead of a fixed value, the allocation proportion should 
gradually decline as the excessive demand increases to 
avoid excessive revenue in the private sector and to pro-
tect public interests.
Given that ptQ  has been predicted from T + 1 to T0, 







t tQ Q Q
CP f Q dQ
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where: f(Qt) = probability density function of Qt; maxtQ  = 
maximum value of Qt, which is obtained from the simu-
lation outputs of Qt; pt tQ Q
CP
>  can be obtained from the 
cumulative probability chart of Qt in the look-up table.
The calculation method of the additional compensa-
tion is developed based on the progressive method. As-
sume that the excessive demand interval [ rtQ , maxtQ ] is 
divided into n subintervals [q0, q1], [q1, q2], …, [qn–1, qn] 
with rtQ = q0, maxt nQ q=  and the length of each subin-
terval, which is defined as the step size, is equal to ∆q = 
( maxtQ – rtQ ) / n. Note that theoretically n  →  ∞ and 
∆q →  0 so that the additional compensation could be 
smoothly increased as ptQ  grows. In practice, however, 
the value of n is artificially determined and is relatively 
low for the reason of simplicity.
For a random step δ, the related subinterval is [qδ–1, 
qδ]. The cumulative probability of Qt reaches its lower 
limit qδ–1, which is denoted as 1tQ q
CP
δ−> , is adopted to 
determine k(δ) as the allocation proportion for step δ.
According to the curves of the cumulative probability and 
the allocation proportion of annual demand in Figure 1(b) 
and Figure 1(c), as Qt increases from rtQ  to maxtQ , the step δ 
for calculating the additional compensation within the subin-
terval [qδ–1, qδ] moves from 1 to n; 1tQ q
CP
δ−>
 will decline 
from | rt tQ QCP >  to 1t nQ q
CP
−>
 and k(δ) will decline from 
100% to 0%. Consider that n → ∞, 
1tQ q
CP
δ−> → 0%; there-












δ = ξ , (11)
where: ξ is a constant. Given that the allocation propor-
tion of the first step is supposed to be 100%, 100% is as-
signed to k(1). Thus, ξ is determined as |1/ r
t tQ Q
CP >  and 















As ptQ  is determined, a series of subintervals [q0, q1], 
[q1, q2], …, [qh–1, 
p
tQ ] also can be determined, where h 
is the last step for ptQ  and qh–1 < 
p
tQ ≤  qh. Therefore, the 
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where: ACt= annual additional compensation for year t, 
t ∈[T + 1,T0].
Total compensation
The annual compensation, which is denoted as TCt, is the 
sum of the annual base compensation and the annual ad-
ditional compensation:
t t tTC BC AC= + , (14)
The total compensation TC is a one-time payment at 
the end of year T, and it is derived as the sum of the an-













To reflect the uncertainty of the interest rate and the 
inflation rate in the remaining concession period (Zhang 
& Abourizk, 2006), here it is assumed that the discount 
rate r as a stochastic input variable, which follows a nor-
mal distribution N (µr, σr2) with a mean value of µr and a 
standard deviation of σr. By performing the Monte Car-
lo simulation, the statistical distribution of TC is finally 
achieved.
3. Illustrative example
An illustrative example of Shuiguan Expressway in China is 
performed to demonstrate how the compensation mecha-
nism works in the early termination of PPP projects.
Shuiguan Expressway was invested as a BOT project 
with total investment of 980 million RMB and a concession 
period of 25 years. The expressway, located in Shenzhen, 
was opened to public in February 2002. Between March 
2009 and July 2011, the project was expanded from 4 lanes 
to 10 lanes with a cost of 1100 million RMB, making it be-
come the widest expressway in China. As the main artery 
to city, the traffic volume of Shuiguan Expressway has sub-
stantially exceeded the previously designed capacity, leading 
to frequent congestions in rush hour. It was also pointed 
out that users suffered from the expensive toll rate, making 
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the proposal of cancelling tolls be placed on the agenda for 
many years. However, the buyback negotiation between the 
government and the private sector becomes fairly tough. 
Therefore, the question presented on the early termination 
of Shuiguan Expressway is how to reach an agreement on a 
fair and reasonable compensation amount.
For the convenience of discussion, simplified data are 
adopted from the case to conduct a workable demonstra-
tion. Passenger Car Unit (PCU) is primarily adopted to 
conduct a truer reflection of the highway capacity. Consid-
ering the fact that annual traffic demand experienced dra-
matic changes after the road expansion, it is assumed that 
road capacity remains the same level in the whole conces-
sion period and only the first investment is considered in 
this numerical example. Based on the data observed in the 
real project, the toll rate basically remains constant in the 
whole concession period. The package Oracle Crystal Ball 
11.1.2.4 is applied to conduct the Monte Carlo simulation 
10,000 times to obtain the probability distribution of the 
target variables at a 95% level of confidence. The predicted 
distributions of stochastic input variables shown in Table 1 
are obtained based on expert judgements and actual expe-
rience from similar transportation projects. In view of the 
variance between the expected data and actual data, the val-
ues of parameters are adjusted according to the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation principle to conduct a relatively per-
suasive result. These parameters are given below:
 – Total construction cost I0 = 980 million RMB;
 – The planned and actual operation period are T0 = 20 
years and T = 15 years, respectively;
 – Toll rate Pt =10 RMB, [1,20]t∈ ;
 – Cost coefficient for the O&M cost ε = 3%;
 – Cost escalation rate f = 10%;
 – The number of steps for calculating the additional 
compensation n = 5.
Table 1. Probability distributions of stochastic input variables
Variable Distribution Unit
0Q Normal distribution (13, 1.32) Million unit
, [1,4]j j∈π Normal distribution (8%, 1%2) –
, [5,9]j j∈π Normal distribution (10%, 1%2) –
, [10,14]j j∈π Normal distribution (5%, 1%2) –
, [15,19]j j∈π Normal distribution (3%, 1%2) –
r Normal distribution (12%, 1%2) –
A summary of the cost and benefit data within the 
whole concession period is provided in Table 2. rtQ  and 
max
tQ  come from the simulation outputs of tQ ; tCI , tCO  
and tNPV  are calculated based on rtQ  in the bidding pe-
riod; atQ  and ati  are obtained from the actual operation 
data, where the high demands for the first 15 years indi-
cates an optimistic case in the future. From year 16 to year 
20, exponential smoothing method is adopted to forecast 
p
ti . In view of the continuous declining trend of ati  from 
year 8 to year 15, Holt’s linear trend method (Holt, 1957) 
is chosen to forecast pti . The smoothing parameters for 
the level and trend are 0.76 and 1 respectively, which are 
obtained through Microsoft Excel Solver’s optimization 
tool by minimizing the sum of squared errors. The fore-
casting results are shown in Figure 3. ptQ  therefore can 
be calculated based on pti  and rtQ .





















ti  or 
p
ti *
0 – – – –980.00 –980.00 – –
1 13.01 16.63 130.00 29.40 –890.18 8.62 –33.74%
2 14.05 17.97 140.40 32.34 –804.03 11.57 –17.66%
3 15.17 19.44 151.63 35.57 –721.43 13.04 –14.02%
4 16.39 21.06 163.76 39.13 –642.22 16.72 2.05%
5 17.70 22.84 176.86 43.04 –566.29 20.16 13.88%
6 19.47 25.15 194.55 47.35 –491.71 25.16 29.21%
7 21.43 27.75 214.00 52.08 –418.47 28.53 33.17%
8 23.58 30.68 235.41 57.29 –346.53 32.14 36.34%
9 25.94 33.96 258.95 63.02 –275.88 34.25 32.02%
10 28.55 37.66 284.84 69.32 –206.49 36.63 28.29%
11 29.98 39.55 299.08 76.26 –142.43 37.28 24.34%
12 31.48 41.55 314.04 83.88 –83.35 39.70 26.12%
13 33.05 43.67 329.74 92.27 –28.93 41.45 25.39%
14 34.71 45.92 346.23 101.50 21.14 42.08 21.23%
15 36.44 48.31 363.54 111.65 67.16 43.68 19.85%
16 37.54 49.76 374.44 122.81 108.21 43.97* 17.14%*
17 38.66 51.27 385.68 135.09 144.71 44.28* 14.51%*
18 39.82 52.83 397.25 148.60 177.04 44.56* 11.89%*
19 41.02 54.44 409.16 163.46 205.57 44.82* 9.26%*
20 42.25 56.12 421.44 179.81 230.62 45.05* 6.63%*
Note: the symbol of ‘*’ is used to identify 
p
tQ  and 
p
ti  from 
a
tQ  and 
a
ti , respectively.
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The calculation of the annual additional compensation 
for year 16 is shown in Table 3, where 16
pQ  falls into the 
third subinterval [42.43, 44.87] so that the additional com-
pensation in the third step only counts from 42.43 to 16
pQ . 
Similarly, the ACt for the remaining years are calculated 
in the same way as that of year 16. The annual compensa-
tion from year 16 to year 20 are listed in Table 4. BCt is 
the annual profit under the referential demand, which is 
equal to the difference of CIt and COt. TCt is the sum of 
BCt and ACt.
Table 3. Calculation of annual additional  
compensation for year 16






( )k P qδ ∆
(million 
RMB)
1 [37.54,39.98] 48.81% 100.00% 24.44
2 [39.98,42.43] 27.45% 56.24% 13.75
3 [42.43,44.87] 12.53% 25.67% 3.97
4 [44.87,47.32] 4.73% 9.69% –
5 [47.32,49.76] 1.25% 2.56% –
Total – – – 42.16









16 251.63 42.16 293.79
17 250.58 40.81 291.39
18 248.64 37.94 286.59
19 245.70 33.10 278.80
20 241.63 28.17 269.80
By discounting the annual compensation to year 15, the 
simulation outputs of the annual discounted compensation 
and the total compensation are shown in Table 5. The prob-
ability distribution and cumulative probability distribution 
of TC are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. Ac-
cording to central limit theorem, TC tends to follow a nor-
mal distribution with mean value of 1029.73 million RMB 
and standard deviation of 29.92 million RMB. On the basis 
of the three standard deviations rule, 99.70% of the 10,000 
values generated in the simulation fall into the range of 
the three standard deviations. Therefore, the mean value 
1029.73 million RMB and a bargain range [939.96 million 
RMB, 1119.49 million RMB] are considered to be the refer-
















Figure 3. Forecasts of offset coefficient













16 262.36 262.30 2.78 252.11 274.94
17 232.40 232.28 4.94 214.57 255.20
18 204.16 203.97 6.51 181.10 234.89
19 177.42 177.16 7.54 151.18 213.84
20 153.39 153.07 8.15 125.54 193.66
TC 1029.73 1028.78 29.92 924.50 1172.52
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4. Discussion
To further investigate the rationality and effectiveness of 
the proposed compensation mechanism in terms of early 
terminated PPP projects, the net present value in three 
scenarios are illustrated and compared in Figure 6.
All of the curves start from an initial construction cost 
of 120 million RMB at year 0. Then the annul NCF is dis-
counted to year 0 and accumulated to the NPV. In the 
scenario under the referential demand where the NPV is 
forecasted in the bidding period, the private sector will 
recover all of its investment in year 14 and obtain 230.62 
million RMB as the NPV within 20 years. For a pessimis-
tic or moderate demand, if a PPP project is terminated 
early, the base compensation in the remaining concession 
period can be calculated according to the solid curve un-
der the referential demand. For the optimistic demand, 
the excessive demand should be reasonably allocated, and 
the additional compensation can be calculated with the 
proposed mechanism. As is shown in the dashed curve, 
the private sector will recover all of its investment earlier 
in year 12 and obtain 252.26 million RMB at the end of 
year 15. For the remaining 5 years, the annual compen-
sation is supposed to be discounted to year 15 and then 
summed up as the final compensation. In order to facili-
tate the analysis, an adjustment is made that the annual 
compensation is discounted to year 0 and then accumu-
lated in correspondence with the data in the solid curve. 
In this case, the NPV obtained in the dashed curve will 
finally reach 440.23 million RMB at the end of year 20, 
which is 91% more than the final NPV obtained in the 
solid curve. The dotted curve, which overlaps the dashed 
curve on the first 15 years’ NPV value, is developed based 
on the actual data in the first 15 years and the NCF from 
the predicted demand for the remaining period. In this 
case, the project is continuously operated by the private 
sector without allocating the excessive predicted demand, 
and will finally gain 501.54 million RMB at the end of 
year 20. This means that without a reasonable allocation 
of excessive demand, the total profit gained by the private 
sector will be more than double of the expected profit un-
der referential demand.
From the termination year’s perspective, if the annual 
demand is predicted to be pessimistic in the remaining 
Figure 4. Probability distribution of total compensation
Figure 5. Cumulative probability distribution of total compensation
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concession period, the compensation paid by the govern-
ment should be the annual referential NCF discounted 
to year 15 and then summed up, which is TC0 = 894.67 
million RMB. As for the optimistic demand case in the 
illustrative example, the mean value of TC = 1029.73 mil-
lion RMB, which is 15% more than TC0. As a comparison, 
without the compensation mechanism, the private sec-
tor would ask for an exorbitant compensation of TC1 = 
1364.43 million RMB, which is 53% more than TC0.
The result indicates that the private sector is entitled 
to claim a compensation which is 15% higher than ex-
pected in the bidding period. This should be acceptable 
for the government who is supposed to be punished for 
its breaching role in the early termination. Meanwhile, TC 
turns out to be not too high as TC1 to damage the public 
interests since the excess demand over what the private 
sector declared in the bidding period has been fairly allo-
cated based on probabilistic analysis. The proposed com-
pensation mechanism not only benefits the government 
from being overcharged, but also enables the private sec-
tor to receive a considerable compensation for the future. 
It might be argued that the compensation is much lower 
than the forecasted profit in an optimistic case, but com-
parably, the private sector would acquire a compensation 
that is higher than the forecasted profit in a pessimistic 
case. Consequently, the compensation mechanism works 
rationally and effectively in the early termination of PPP 
projects, and would be acceptable to both parties.
Conclusions
Compensation is the greatest concern in the negotiation 
process between the government and private sector with 
regard to the early termination of PPP projects. This paper 
proposes an ex-ante mechanism to determine the com-
pensation of early termination that is frequently caused by 
government default or voluntary buyback. In view of the 
demand uncertainty that appears in the whole concession 
period, a fair compensation model is developed based on 
the probabilistic analysis of annual demand, which is con-
ducted through the integration of NPV method and Monte 
Carlo simulations. The proposed compensation mechanism 
extends the idea of excess revenue sharing and minimum 
demand guarantee into the early termination of PPP pro-
jects. Rather than using the return on investment to deter-
mine the level of government guarantees, this compensa-
tion mechanism is proposed based on the cumulative prob-
ability that a given demand could be realized to determine 
early termination compensation under demand uncertainty.
The main contribution of this paper is that demand 
risk has been fairly allocated between the government and 
the private sector, who jointly confirmed the compensa-
tion criterion and the initial demand forecast as the ref-
erential demand using the cumulative probability in the 
project’s bidding period: if the actual demand is higher 
than the referential demand, the excessive demand should 
be reasonably allocated; if the actual demand is lower than 
the referential demand, demand risk should be transferred 
to the government, who is supposed to provide the com-
pensation at the referential demand level.
This compensation mechanism generates a reason-
able compensation for the private sector to recover losses 
while preventing the government from being overcharged, 
through which the public interests are protected as well. 
Moreover, thanks to the predetermined compensation cri-
terion, time-consuming negotiations as well as high ex-
post costs could be hopefully avoided during the contract 
termination, and a smooth transfer of the early terminated 
project is more likely to be achieved. For the government, 
it is beneficial to ease the burden of termination compen-
sation and to avoid excessive revenue in the private sector. 
For the private sector, it is also acceptable to mitigate risks 
and to gain reasonable compensation.
Due to the limitation of this research, some cost items 
including the liabilities, sums payable to subcontractors 















Forecasted NPV under referential demand
Expected NPV under actual demand in the first 15 years and
allocated demand in the remaining 5 years
Expected NPV under actual demand in the first 15 years and
predicted demand in the remaining 5 years
Figure 6. Net present value in three scenarios
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proposed compensation methodology and simulation-
based approach should be compared with other methods, 
such as real options and game theory, and proven in prac-
tice. It is also noted that the responsibility allocation, the 
residual value of the project, whether the project will be 
rebid as well as other consequences that are caused by the 
early termination are worth considering in future research.
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